Tenant isolation
Tenant context is enforced in application services and by forced PostgreSQL row-level security across tenant tables.
Security & trust
Governance is part of the execution path.
Atlas is designed with controls aligned to enterprise security expectations. This page separates implemented engineering evidence from external certifications that have not been obtained.
Assurance statusNo SOC 2, ISO 27001, HIPAA, or PCI certification is claimed. External assessment and procurement remain required for customer production.
Identity and authorization
OIDC/JWKS authentication, RBAC, SCIM architecture, policy decisions, and exact resource authorization are separate controls.
Read-only data access
Connector capabilities default to read-only roles, validated queries, bounded execution, cancellation, and explicit cost limits.
Evidence integrity
Findings bind to governed sources, freshness, query lineage, verification outcomes, and integrity-checked artifacts.
Agent safety
Tool allowlists, prompt-injection defenses, typed plans, budget enforcement, refusal paths, and deterministic checks constrain agents.
Secrets and encryption
Application rows store secret references, providers resolve credentials at execution time, and redaction covers logs, traces, jobs, and errors.
Immutable audit
High-value changes produce append-only, tenant-bound audit events with database protections against mutation.
Hardened delivery
Non-root containers, pinned CI actions, dependency and secret scans, IaC validation, network policies, backups, and restore drills are release gates.
Defense in depth
Policy follows the request all the way down.
The browser is never an authority. Identity resolves to a tenant-bound request context; services authorize the exact resource and action; PostgreSQL independently enforces tenant rows; connector and agent tools apply another policy boundary.
01IdentityOIDC/JWKS · issuer · audience
02Request contexttenant · subject · correlation
03Authorizationrole · policy · exact resource
04Data enforcementforced RLS · least privilege
05Tool boundaryread-only · cost · time · evidence
Objective release evidence
Controls are tied to executable checks.
65 tenant tables restored with forced RLS in the Phase 7 drill
450 PostgreSQL, Redis, RLS, and related integration tests
Non-root UID 10001 with vulnerability scanning in CI
69 tables restored in a disposable drill; stated RPO is snapshot-bounded
Responsible disclosure
The public issue tracker must not receive secrets, customer data, or active exploit details. A private security mailbox will be published only after the email domain is authenticated and monitored.
Need the implementation model? Read the security documentation. Production customer release remains unauthorized.